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Research Question/Issue: This review examines how gender diversity on corporate 
boards influences corporate governance outcomes that in turn impact performance. We 
describe extant research on theoretical perspectives, characteristics and impact of 
women directors on corporate boards (WOCB) at micro, meso and macro levels: 
individual, board, firm and industry/environment.  
 
Research Finding/Insights: To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
comprehensive review of WOCBs, incorporating and integrating research from over 
400 publications in psychology, sociology, leadership, gender, finance, management, 
law, corporate governance and entrepreneurship domains. In addition, we organized our 
findings to provide a new lens enabling the field to be readily examined by level and by 
theoretical perspective. The review indicates that WOCB research is about improving 
corporate governance through better use of the whole talent pool’s capital, as well as 
about building more inclusive and fairer business institutions that better reflect their 
present generation stakeholders. 
 
Theoretical/Academic Implications: With only one in ten papers addressing 
theoretical development, the predominant perspectives are human and social capital 
theories and gender schema at individual level; social identity, token and social 
networks theories at board level; resource dependency, institution and agency theories at 
firm level, and institutional, critical and political theories at environmental level. We 
provide a short synopsis of findings at each level, and conclude with an outline of 
fruitful directions for future research. 
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Practitioner/Policy Implications: There are increasing pressures for WOCBs, from 
diverse stakeholders such as the European Commission, national governments, 
politicians, employer lobby groups, shareholders, Fortune and FTSE rankings, best 
places for women to work lists as well as expectations from highly qualified women 
who are likely to leave if they see no women board members. Rationales generally draw 
on the business case, however the moral justice case is also used by those who seek a 
fairer gender balance in all aspects of society.  From our review, the ‘Impact’ section 
charts the effect of WOCB at all four levels of analysis. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
As recent corporate governance scandals and the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation, 
Higgs Review and other initiatives draw attention to the importance of corporate 
governance, scrutiny has turned to the composition of corporate boards of directors. For 
example, the demise of Icelandic bank Kaupthing led to the immediate resignation of 
the entire board of directors (The Age, 2008). In the wake of the failure of other 
financial institutions such as Lehman Brothers, investors, governments and concerned 
parties around the world are demanding answers to questions such as that posted in two 
separate official blogs of Wall Street Journal and Business Week: ‘Where was Lehman’s 
Board?’ (Berman, 2008; Thompson, 2008). While the market plunge has brought recent 
press to the attentiveness of the directors of the board, practitioners and academics have 
long followed board composition, including the slow advancement of women onto 
corporate boards, despite nearly 40 years of equal opportunities policies. A Google 
search reveals 340,000 webpages for female or women corporate board directors, 
including 25,400 webpages in Google Scholar. Extant research emerges from an 
interdisciplinary academic community, across psychology, sociology, leadership, 
gender, finance, management, law, corporate governance and even entrepreneurship. It 
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is timely therefore to pull together research on the nature and impact of gender diversity 
in board composition as a facet of corporate governance. 
Female representation in corporate decision-making is an important issue for 
policymakers. For example, the Norwegian government requires that boards of directors 
of publicly held firms be comprised of at least 40% women (Hoel, 2008) and the 
Spanish government has committed to 40% by 2015 (De Anca, 2008). Around the 
world, other countries are considering legislation while developing economies such as 
India and China, and Middle East countries (Tunisia and Jordan) are beginning to 
recognise the importance of developing female talent up to board level (Singh, 2008).  
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive review of extant 
research on women on corporate boards (WOCB). We reviewed over 400 published 
references, including articles, book chapters, working papers and reports. The literature 
was identified through EBSCO, ProQuest and Google Scholar searches. In press and 
working papers were solicited by e-mail from forty scholars of gender and corporate 
governance who recently published in leading journals or presented papers at 
conferences. 
In the following sections, we review the literature of women directors in three 
key areas: theoretical perspectives, characteristics and impact. We recognize that there 
are additional areas, such as initiatives to promote women to directorships; however we 
consider these outside the scope of our study
i
. A final section suggests directions for 
future studies in existing research streams, as well as major recommendations for new 
research agendas. 
We explore each major theme across four micro, meso and macro levels: 
individual, board, firm, industry/environment. By individual, we refer to the individual 
Director, or aspirant Director. The board level captures the processes and interactions 
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that occur within the team. We use the ‘firm’ category to describe experiences in other 
parts of the firm, outside the board and also firm strategy and structure. 
Industry/environment captures the local, regional and national industrial and external 
environments. While these categories are overlapping given the fluid nature of business, 
we hope this structure guides our reader and aids future researchers. Table 1 provides an 
overview of the review. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
The vast majority of academic literature on WOCBs (approximately 160 of 180 
published articles, working papers and book chapters reviewed) does not explicitly 
develop a theoretical framework. Indeed, the majority of WOCB literature is 
descriptive
ii
. We identified twenty theory-based studies of the phenomenon of women 
on boards that employ a variety of frameworks at micro, meso and macro levels. The 
major theoretical perspectives and, in most cases, a short synopsis of findings, are 
described below. Consistent with the feminist mode of inquiry, most studies explore 
theoretical perspectives on what forces explain women’s underrepresentation on 
corporate boards. Several theories bridge two or more levels of analysis. For example, 
gender self-schema is an individual perception which can be manifested in groups, 
firms, industries and the broader institutional environment. Some studies incorporate 
two or more theoretical perspectives. For example, Burke and Nelson (2002) examine 
how a combination of individual and organizational factors explains the exclusion of 
talented women from top management. 
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Individual 
At the individual level, theoretical perspectives tend to focus on the 
characteristics of WOCBs (e.g. human capital, status characteristics, social capital) and 
the individual’s gender-based perceptions (e.g. self-schema, trust). 
Human Capital. Human capital theory (Becker, 1964) examines the role of an 
individual’s cumulative stocks of education, skills and experience in enhancing 
cognitive and productive capabilities which benefit the individual and his/her 
organization. Compared to men, women have traditionally made fewer investments in 
education and work experience and this is reflected in lower pay and promotion 
(Tharenou, Latimer and Conway, 1994). Directors bring unique human capital to the 
board (Kesner, 1988) and individuals must obtain extensive stocks of human capital in 
order to be considered for directorships (Kesner, 1988). Gatekeepers, who are mostly 
male, do not offer women the same organizational rewards such as training and 
development, as well as promotion and pay (Oakley, 2000). A commonly held 
assumption of board selectors is that women lack adequate human capital for board 
positions (Burke, 2000). Singh, Terjesen and Vinnicombe (2008) dispel this myth in 
their study of multiple human capital dimensions of new directors of FTSE
iii
 100 firms 
in the UK, finding that women are more likely to have MBA degrees and international 
experience. Furthermore, compared to their male counterparts, new female directors are 
significantly more likely to have experience as smaller firm board directors, but less 
likely to have CEO/COO experience. 
Human capital theory has been extended in other meaningful ways
iv
. For 
example, Westphal and Milton (2000) examine the role of a director’s prior experience 
on his/her ability to avoid out-group biases and to exert influence on the board, finding 
that women are significantly less likely to have focal director experience in the majority 
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and to exert influence. Shrader, Blackburn and Iles (1997) leverage resource-based 
theories of competitive advantage to describe human capital as a key resource for the 
firm, bringing diversity perspectives that facilitate team problem solving. 
Status Characteristics. Status characteristics theory describes how standards of 
ability for low-status groups (such as women) are higher than for high-status group 
members (e.g. men). Thus, to be perceived as being of high ability, a woman must 
provide more evidence than would her male counterpart (Biernat and Kobrynowicz, 
1997). Considering this theory in parallel with women’s traditional ‘outsider’ status, 
Hillman, Cannella and Harris (2002) find that women directors are significantly more 
likely to have an advanced degree than their male counterparts. 
Gender Self-Schema. Self-schema is an individual’s psychological construction 
of self, based on a number of aspects, most commonly gender.  Gender self-schemas are 
developed from childhood and serve as mental models through which information is 
processed. Generally, male gender self-schemas are based on roles, norms, values and 
beliefs which are considered appropriate for men, such as income provider, dominance, 
aggression, achievement, autonomy, exhibition and endurance (Konrad et al, 2000).  In 
contrast, female gender self-schemas are largely based on roles, norms, values and 
beliefs held about women such as homemaker, affiliation to others, nurturance, 
deference and abasement (Konrad et al, 2000). These self-schemas are present from the 
point at which male and female graduates evaluate and enter the workplace (Terjesen, 
Freeman and Vinnicombe, 2008). Gatekeepers have views of gender-appropriate 
behaviors, roles and expectations which may bias executive selection (Oakley, 2000).  
 
Board 
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At the board level, theory focuses on group-level processes such as social 
identity, homophily and in-out groups. While composition is important, board processes 
may be even more critical to performance (Huse, 2005). 
Social identity. Several related theories of social groups (e.g. attraction-
selection-attrition, homophily) explore how individuals seek to surround themselves 
with people who share similar demographic profiles, perspectives and values, which are 
then reinforced in intragroup communication. Tajfel and Turner’s (1986) social identity 
theory describes how individuals define themselves according to their membership in 
certain groups such as gender, race, class and occupation. Individuals consider 
themselves and others as either in- or out-group members and are more likely to provide 
higher evaluations of in-group members, making it more difficult for out-group 
individuals to join these groups. 
These theoretical frameworks have been used, independently or in parallel, to 
describe women’s exclusion from social networks.  For example, Kanter (1977)’s work 
on homosocial reproduction highlights how individuals in powerful positions replicate 
male-dominated power structures in corporations. Leveraging theories of homosocial 
reproduction, Daily and Dalton (1995) describe how CEOs, who are mostly men, are 
more likely to lead boards composed of like others, of the same gender, as well as age, 
background and experience. 
Following Kanter’s (1977) work on tokenism, Erkut, Kramer and Konrad (2009) 
explore three dimensions of numerical representation of women: one woman, two 
women and three women. Drawing on Asch’s (1951) conformity theory and the role of 
vision, they describe how a critical mass of three or more women creates  
‘normalization’ where gender is no longer a barrier to communication and where 
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women directors are more likely to feel comfortable, supported and freer to raise issues 
and be active. 
Westphal and Milton (2000) explore the idea that social exclusion due to 
minority status (e.g. as a woman) could be overcome through ingratiatory behavior. 
Social identity and social network and cohesion theories have also been put forward as 
possible explanations for the paucity of women on boards (Singh and Vinnicombe, 
2004). 
Social Network and Social Cohesion. The elite group can be seen as a social 
network. Social network theory predicts that individuals with access to resources 
valuable to the company are likely to have the best chance of entering the elite network. 
Directors are nodes in a network of organizational linkages, and contribute resources 
such as information and knowledge to their board, their organization and to other 
members of the network, sharing power and acting as a socially cohesive group 
(Westphal and Zajac, 1995; Windolf, 1998). A board is a privileged closed group with 
its own rules and ways of thinking. Directors facilitate invitations to join other boards, 
by recommending and sponsoring colleagues like themselves, whom they know are 
likely to fit the existing mould. As powerful positions are a marker of relevant 
experience, contacts and endorsement, those who have held CEO positions are 
particularly attractive to the network. Hillman, Cannella and Harris (2002) take a 
network theory perspective in examining how firms may wish to increase their odds of 
acquiring resources and surviving by becoming more central in networks and linkages 
to other firms. Their subsample of 89 white female and 99 white male board members 
reveals that women directors are more likely to join subsequent boards at faster rates 
than their male counterparts. 
 9 
Gendered Trust. Another line of recent psychological theory enquiry is trust. 
Bigelow and Parks (2006) leverage gendered theories of trust to explore board 
relationships. While trust is variously defined in the literature, scholars in many fields 
identify gender differences, for example in trusting behaviour, with men more likely to 
have the basis of their trust in others, particularly shared group status (collective trust) 
and women more likely to trust both on this collective trust as well as on the basis of a 
personal relationship (relationship trust) (Maddux and Brewer, 2005). Building on 
research highlighting that women have identifiable traits that make them well positioned 
for roles that require trust, Bigelow and Parks (2006) report that investors are willing to 
invest 300% more in male-led firms than in female-led firms. 
Ingratiation. Within the social psychology literature, an important dimension of 
interpersonal influence is ingratiatory behaviour to enhance one’s attractiveness and 
gain favour with others. Following studies linking ingratiation to career success, 
Westphal and Stern’s (2000) survey of 1012 top managers of Forbes 500 firms reveals 
that top managers who display ingratiatory behaviour toward their CEO are more likely 
to be appointed to boards of other firms where their CEO is a director or is indirectly 
connected through a board interlock network. This behaviour can help overcome the 
barrier of demographic minority status such as gender. 
Leadership. While not directly developing the research on gender in corporate 
board processes, Huse and Solberg (2006)’s interviews with eight WOCBs reveal the 
importance of nurturing contacts, preparing for meetings, creating alliances as well as 
their observations about presence of power games and unequal decision-making in the 
process.  Huse (2008) develops a conceptual framework that describes how board 
leadership, structures, development activities, culture and levels of openness mediate 
the influence of women directors on task performance. Furthermore, Huse (2008) 
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proposes that women will make specific contributions if they have backgrounds, 
personalities and behaviors which are different from men on the board and if they are 
perceived and treated as different from their male counterparts. 
 
Firm  
At the firm level, common perspectives include resource dependency, 
institutional and agency theories. 
Resource Dependency. A number of studies employ a resource dependency 
lens which views firms as operating in an open system and needing to exchange and 
acquire certain resources in order to survive, creating a dependency between the firm 
and external units. Within the corporate governance literature, firms seek linkages with 
the most beneficial resources, and structure membership on the corporate board on this 
basis. Building on Pfeffer and Salacik’s (1978) arguments that board linkages provide 
advice/counsel, legitimacy and communication channels, scholars highlight the 
important resources from directors’ human capital and social capital.   
Diversity scholars use the resource dependency framework to argue that today’s 
increasingly complex and uncertain environment requires leadership from individuals 
who can provide a breadth of resources including prestige, legitimacy, financing, 
industrial/functional/geographic knowledge and diversity. For example, Siciliano (1996) 
reports that YMCA boards with increased gender diversity are more likely to enjoy high 
levels of social agency mission achievement, but less likely to achieve fundraising goals 
and there is no relationship to operating efficiency.  
Hillman, Cannella and Paetzold (2000) significantly extend resource 
dependency theory to diversity on boards, outlining four director types: ‘insiders’, 
‘business experts’, ‘support specialists’ and ‘influentials’.v Female directors of Fortune 
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1000 boards are more likely to have non-business backgrounds, to hold advanced 
degrees and to join many boards at a faster rate than their white male counterparts 
(Hillman, Cannella and Harris, 2002). Women’s representation on boards is linked to 
organization size, industry type, firm diversification strategy and the network effects of 
linkages to other boards with female directors (Hillman, Shropshire and Cannella, 
2007). Peterson and Philpot (2007) leverage resource dependency theory and the 
director taxonomy to examine the likelihood for female and male director’s odds of 
being appointed to a standing committee, finding that women’s resource dependency 
linkages lead them to be more likely to be appointed to certain committees, but not 
others.  
Institutional. Building on institutional perspectives of achieved legitimacy from 
the promotion of women to strategic positions in management, Bilimoria (2000) argues 
that female board member presence signals that a corporation values the success of its 
women. Bilimoria (2006) extends institutional legitimacy theory to explore the 
relationship between the presence of women on boards and the presence of women at 
multiple levels in the company, finding a positive relationship between female corporate 
board members and the following: number of women officers, number of women 
officers holding line jobs, presence of a critical mass of women officers, women officers 
with high-ranking or ‘clout’ titles and women among the top corporate earners. 
Agency. Most corporate governance research takes an agency theory approach 
(Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel and Jackson, 2008). Agency theory describes the 
relationship between a principal (e.g. shareholder) and the agent of the principal (e.g. 
directors and managers), often considering the costs of resolving conflicts and aligning 
interests across groups. A common assumption in agency theory is that outside directors 
will act independently from their inside director counterparts and will act as good 
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monitors for shareholders’ interest. Carter, Simkins and Simpson (2003) draw on 
agency theory to explore the link between gender diversity on a board and firm value, 
finding a positive relationship between the percentage of gender diversity on Fortune 
1000 boards and firm value. 
 
Industry and Environment 
We could not identify any extant theory-based research at the industry level. 
Research at the environment level most commonly examines the role of institutions. 
 
Institutional. Terjesen and Singh (2008) explore the role of the social, political 
and economic structures in the institutional environment on women’s share of 
representation on corporate boards. Their 43 country study reveals that countries with 
higher representation of women on boards are more likely to have women in senior 
management and more equal ratios of male to female pay. However, countries with a 
shorter tradition of women’s political representation are less likely to have high 
proportions of WOCBs.  
The perspective of gender is not only an individual property, but also as an 
institution embedded in the workplace, occupations and occupational environments 
through formally defined rules, roles and responsibilities and the ‘habitus’ of mental 
structures through which individuals think about their social world. Talmud and Izraeli 
(1999) argue that these influences are not easily eliminated. 
Nelson and Levesque (2007) highlight the presence of institutional factors such 
as occupational sex discrimination, childcare responsibilities, stereotypes and gender 
schemas that may influence the presence of women on boards of high-growth, high 
potential firms undergoing initial public offering, but do not test these ideas in their 
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empirical study. It is important to acknowledge the interrelationships among these 
theories. For example, the institutionalized expectation that women should fulfil caring 
responsibilities presents a major barrier for women seeking to combine career and 
motherhood, or increasingly, elder care.  
Critical Management. Adams and Flynn (2005) take an innovative and multi-
dimensional critical theory approach to better understand how established processes can 
confine change in terms of gender representation on corporate boards. They identify 
constraining factors at individual, group (e.g. psychological perspectives), firm and 
external environment levels and use the knowledge creation framework to describe how 
individuals create actionable knowledge through structural, cognitive and relational 
dimensions of board members and their networks.  
 
CHARACTERISTICS 
A large body of census research, predominantly conducted in Western countries, 
reports basic characteristics. This section reviews literature along the four levels. 
 
Individual 
Demographics. Since the 1990s, a substantial body of literature considers the 
demographics. A consistent finding is that women directors are significantly younger 
than their male counterparts, with comparisons in the range of 53 years for the UK’s 
FTSE 100 female directors, compared to 56 for males (Sealy, Singh and Vinnicombe, 
2007). Australian statistics are similar: women’s average age is 53 and men’s is 61 
(Ross-Smith and Bridge, 2008). Peterson and Philpot’s (2007) U.S. Fortune 500 study 
reports women and men’s average ages to be 56 and 60 respectively. Burgess and 
Tharenou (2002)’s meta-analysis of Australian, US and Canadian studies find that 
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between 65-71% of women directors are married. Earlier, Burke and Kurucz (1998) find 
just 47% of women directors are married. Women directors with children comprise 44% 
in Australia and 70% in the USA and Canada, although the Australian sample includes 
dependent children (Burgess and Tharenou, 2002). Women insiders hold fewer 
directorships, have less powerful titles, occupy more staff positions and earn less than 
men (Zelchowski and Bilimoria, 2004). 
Social Capital. In the 1980s and 1990s, UK female directors were significantly 
more likely to have a title, whether academic (Dr., Professor) aristocratic (Lady, 
Honourable), civic or political (Dame, Baroness); however this is not the case presently 
(Sealy et al, 2007). In the US, there is a preference for “branded women” directors, i.e. 
those with Ivy League universities, signalling upper class status (Mattis, 2000). In a 
study of women directors in the Middle East, Singh (2008b) notes that the majority of 
Jordan’s women directors are connected to the controlling or founding family, 
signalling the importance of “wasta” (connections). 
Westphal and Milton (2000) examine how network ties affect minority 
directors’ influence on the rest of the board, finding that a minority director with 
previous board experience can mitigate out-group biases.  Minority directors can build 
social network ties with other directors, enabling them to create the perception of 
similarity with the majority (Westphal and Milton, 2000). In Australia, women who 
successfully obtain board positions have long-standing, close relationships with other 
female directors (Sheridan, 2001). 
Human Capital. Hillman et al (2000) develop a taxonomy of four director roles 
based on human capital experience: insiders, business experts, specialists, and 
community influentials. Women and African-American Fortune 500 firm directors are 
more likely to have non-business backgrounds, hold advanced degrees and join boards 
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at a faster rate than their white male counterparts (Hillman et al, 2002). Minority groups 
who gain post-graduate qualifications can compensate for effects of discrimination and 
subjective bias in selection procedures (Hillman et al, 2002).  
Peterson and Philpot (2007) conclude that the women currently holding 13.2% 
of US Fortune 500 directorships are as highly qualified as men, coming from various 
positions of power and authority in public and private organizations (Branson, 2006), 
government, law firms, not-for-profit organizations and academia. The proportion of 
men and women categorized as business experts or support specialists (67.1% vs. 
66.8%) is not significantly different. Singh et al (2008) profile human capital of FTSE 
100 board appointments, finding female appointees are more likely to hold an MBA 
degree and have minor board experience, and somewhat more experience on 
international boards. Men are somewhat more likely to have experience in 
CEO/COO/MD roles and women are significantly less likely to be Executive Directors 
(EDs) (3.6%), but no less likely to be business experts (Singh et al, 2008).  Both UK 
and US studies show that women are more likely than men to be community influentials 
(Hillman et al, 2007; Singh et al, 2008). A somewhat unexpected finding in Singh et 
al’s study was that almost 25% of women appointed in 2001-2004 already had 
FTSE100 board experience. Women hold significantly more multiple directorships; 5% 
of women, but <1% of men have two or more seats (Sealy et al, 2007). The recycling of 
a small group of women means that they become extremely experienced as directors. 
But the recycling perpetuates only a small group of women candidates. For example, of 
150 new director appointments in 2007, whilst 30 [20%] went to women, only five had 
not previously held a FTSE board position. Farrell and Hersch (2005) suggest the over-
representation of women with multiple directorships is an argument for a shortage of 
supply, indicative of a limited number of qualified candidates.  
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Of Canada’s 278 female directors, 90% are university graduates, and 
approximately 25% have one or more professional designations. However, whilst the 
majority are full-time employees (57%), 13% own businesses, 21% serve as 
independent consultants and about half were less than 45 years old (Burke, 1995). 
Peterson and Philpot (2007) find that female Inside Directors (IDs) are significantly 
more likely to be founder or family members (45.5%) than are male IDs (12.9%), 
suggesting perhaps that thwarted by a lack of career progression, women leave to start 
their own businesses. Nelson and Levesque (2007) report that women in high-growth, 
high-potential firms achieve executive roles at a younger age than women in Fortune 
500, but so do men. 
Evidence from the US and UK clearly refutes the claim that women lack the 
“right” human capital for directorships. Women directors’ combination of human 
capital assets differs from traditional (and generally more male) accumulation, but 
brings added value to boards. However, regardless of the reality, several studies reveal 
that it is the perceptions of women that are also often a problem. For example, Mattis 
(2000) cites a Catalyst 1993 survey in which CEOs fear appointing a women to the 
board due to a belief that women are unqualified (Burke, 1997) and a concern that they 
will have a “women’s agenda”. In addition, CEOs are afraid to appoint women not 
currently holding a directorship, but do not hold the same fear for men (Peterson and 
Philpot, 2007). Although Heilman and Haynes (2005) present evidence that prior work 
experience can counteract negative expectations of a woman’s performance, women are 
presumed to be less competent than men (by both men and women) in a male-
dominated environment (Carli, 1990). Unequivocally successful women are then 
disliked for contravening gender roles (Eagly and Karau, 2002), unless they can also 
prove their femininity or communal traits (Heilman and Okimoto, 2007). In Australia, 
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conceptions of leadership include core values such as heroism, physical and emotional 
toughness and self-reliance (Sinclair, 1998). This masculine ideology of leadership 
perpetuates the status quo of who looks like a leader, and the perception is that a leader 
is not a female. 
A UK study reports that 40% of CEOs believe women have not been in the 
pipeline long enough, compared to only 28% of senior women (Catalyst and 
Opportunity Now, 2000). In both the UK and US there are tenure differences between 
male and female board members, but only of approximately two years. Zelechowski and 
Bilimoria (2004) point to more significant pipeline issues in their study of 40 non-CEO 
female and 60 non-CEO male IDs. While there are no sex differences in experience-
based qualifications of board or corporate tenure, female IDs hold less powerful 
corporate titles, fewer multiple directorships, occupy more staff functions, and earn 
considerably less than male IDs, implying that women are both under-valued and under-
utilized in the executive suite and corporate governance (Zelechowski and Bilimoria, 
2004). There are clear implications for pipeline theory, since the CEO pipeline is based 
on the treatment of and value give to the top IDs and women do not appear to be as well 
strategically placed to inherit a CEO role as their male colleagues (Zelechowski and 
Bilimoria, 2004). 
In FTSE 100 firms, the percent of female executive committee members has 
increased; sixty companies now have women in their top team, totalling 16% of senior 
executive roles (Sealy et al, 2007). Women’s roles have also broadened, suggesting 
more varied routes to the board. Whilst human resources and company secretary roles 
continue to dominate, there is an increasing variety of other roles for women on these 
committees, including divisional/regional CEO, MD, CFO, and COO.  
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Board 
Structure and Size. Several single-country studies of board level characteristics 
exist; however cross-country comparisons are difficult given the different corporate 
governance structures, for example the two-tier system of separate supervisory and 
executive boards in parts of continental Europe and the Middle East (Singh and 
Vinnicombe, 2003), and Principal and Acting board members in some South American 
countries (Mulcahy, 2007). A consistent finding is that the larger the board, the greater 
the number of female directors (Sealy et al, 2007; Hyland and Marcellino, 2002; 
Brammer et al, 2007; Singh, 2008), however some countries cap the number of directors 
on their boards.  
Roles. Peterson and Philpot (2007) extend earlier studies (Kesner, 1988; 
Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994) which suggest that men and women have different board 
roles, with women less likely to serve on key committees. Whilst women are less likely 
to be on executive committees and more likely to be on public affairs committees, 
gender is no longer a significant factor in the likelihood of being on the nomination, 
compensation, finance or audit committees (Peterson and Philpot, 2007). In Fortune 500 
firms, women IDs hold 6% of the seats. Again, care must be taken when making 
international comparisons, as this ID figure of 6% represents 6% of all female-held 
board seats. In the UK, female EDs hold 3.6% (2007) of the total number of ED seats 
(Sealy et al, 2007). Using the comparable figure of the female-held seats, the percentage 
is 10.7%. 
Composition. Corporate governance reforms in the US (Sarbanes-Oxley, 2002) 
and UK (Higgs Review, 2003; Tyson Report, 2003) have resulted in a better balance 
between executive and non-executive positions and greater diversity (Arfken et al, 
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2004). For example, in the UK, 2007 witnessed the lowest number of executive and 
total directorships in recent history, suggesting keen competition for executive seats 
(Sealy et al, 2008). This is often cited, however, as an explanation of why women have 
achieved non-executive director (NED) but not ED roles
vi
. Daily et al (1999) track 
changes in Fortune 500 WOCBs between 1987 to 1996, noting a significant increase in 
the number of female directors and the number of companies with female directors, but 
no increase in the number of female CEOs (2) and a decline (from 11 to 8) in number of 
female IDs. Given that a stint on board as an ID/ED is the most common route to CEO, 
Daily et al (1999) concludes that the number of female CEOs is unlikely to grow 
substantially in the near future. In a separate study of Fortune 500 firms in the 1990s, 
Farrell and Hersch (2005) report that the likelihood of a firm adding a woman to its 
board is significantly negatively affected by the percentage of WOCBs in the previous 
year. The probability is greatly increased, however, when a female director leaves: 
companies are likely to want to replace a woman with another woman, clearly showing 
that gender impacts the choice of director. Erkut, Kramer and Konrad’s (2009) 
interviews with 37 WOCBs, 12 CEOs and seven Company Secretaries reveal different 
dynamics when there are one, two or three women on the board. Academics have long 
challenged individualistic explanations of leadership effectiveness, giving evidence of 
the need to have a critical mass. Erkut et al (2009) discuss how dynamics move from 
invisibility to conspiracy to normality, and that it is only at that point that the diversity 
of group appears to become a group responsibility.                                                                                                                                                              
 
Firm  
Size. A number of studies report correlations between a firm’s size, by revenue 
or market capitalization, and the number of WOCBs (Peterson and Philpot, 2007; 
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Terjesen and Singh, 2008; Hyland and Marcellino, 2002; Burke, 2000). Both in the UK 
and US the distribution of female directors decreases the further down the FTSE or 
Fortune listing, belying the myth that it is easier for women to succeed in smaller firms 
(Sealy et al, 2007). Again, international comparisons are difficult as some countries’ 
firms (e.g. US) are larger than others.  
Shareholder Distribution. Stakeholder theory purports the need to take into 
account the wider interests of stakeholders, which is affected by the concentration of the 
majority or minority shareholders (Carter et al, 2003; Hillman, Keim and Luce, 2001). 
Institutional investors can compel companies to greater diversity (Gillan and Starks, 
2000). Kang et al (2007) find that shareholder concentration is significantly negatively 
associated with independence and gender, although not with age. They imply, therefore, 
that those organizations with higher shareholder concentration are not under as much 
pressure to promote board diversity. 
Performance. Women directors’ impact on the board is covered in the next 
major section of this review; here we consider performance as a firm characteristic. 
Women are more likely than men to serve in precarious management positions, a 
phenomenon Ryan and Haslam (2005; 2007) describe as the glass cliff. This 
organizational context makes it harder for women to perform and be perceived to 
perform effectively. However, Farrell and Hersch (2005) report that women tend to 
serve on boards of better performing firms and suggest that shortage of supply allows 
women to self-select the firms, or that these firms are able to focus more on diversity 
goals. Fortune’s top diversity-promoting firms (1998-2002) experience positive, 
significant abnormal returns on the female director announcement date (Ellis and Keys, 
2003). Similarly, of 353 Fortune 500 companies (1996-2000), the 88 with the highest 
representation of women on top management teams experienced significantly higher 
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returns on equity and total return to shareholders compared to the 89 firms with the 
lowest women’s representation (Catalyst, 2004). Hillman et al (2007) find when a firm 
is linked to other firms with female directors, it is more likely to have WOCBs. All this, 
however, is exploring a link between gender diversity and performance, not establishing 
causality. Shrader et al (1997) describes evidence of some negative accounting 
measures and WOCBs, but as Erkut et al (2009) also suggest, a critical number of 
female board members is needed before they can exert a positive influence, and most of 
their sample have only one female director. Nelson and Levesque (2007: 214) argue that 
organizations undergoing regulatory and market review during initial public offering 
have a “greater opportunity and motivation to design a governance structure that 
responds to public concerns about independent oversight” and therefore a more diverse 
leadership. However, as the high-growth high potential firm struggles to “join the big 
boys”, it may also become institutionalized in terms of trying to look more like their 
aspirants, discarding distinctive practices and conforming to a norm. In their sample of 
100 IPO and 100 Fortune 500 companies, Nelson and Levesque (2007) identify only 
one female CEO and one female Board Chair. There are higher percentages of WOCBs 
in the Fortune 500 than the IPO companies, and for technology intensive or venture-
capital-backed firms, the percentages are the lowest. In the IPO firms, almost 60% of 
executive teams and 80% of boards do not have a single woman on them, compared to 
Fortune 500 figures of 41% and 14% respectively. 
 
Industry and Environment 
A number of studies present correlations between particular industry sectors and 
an increased number of WOCBs, e.g. retail, finance, media, banking, and health care 
(Hyland and Marcellino, 2002; Brammer et al, 2007; Hillman et al, 2007; Fryxell and 
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Lerner, 1989; Joy, 2009; Sealy et al, 2007). However, findings are inconsistent and 
there are discrepancies on the index of companies as to what types of organization are 
included. Kang et al (2007) find industry type is significantly associated with 
independence and age, but not gender diversity. 
As previously mentioned, based on resource dependency theory, one might 
expect more women directors in industries with a higher female workforce (Hillman et 
al, 2007). However, the opposite is not necessarily true as Sealy et al (2007) show: 
FTSE 100 companies in male-oriented industries (mining, oil) have women in their top 
positions. Brammer et al (2007) also suggest that close proximity to consumers plays a 
more significant role in affecting board diversity than does industry workforce, 
reflecting the influence of a firm’s external business environment.  
International Differences. One challenge in making international comparisons 
is the lack of a universal set of measures. For example, the European Professional 
Women’s Network (2008) uses a varying number of companies from each European 
country and takes no account of firm size or board structure. Generalisability of findings 
across national boundaries is difficult due to different cultural, economic and regulatory 
environments (Kang et al, 2007), capital markets (Joy, 2008), sample sizes (Burgess and 
Tharenou, 2002) and effectiveness of government mechanisms.  
Within-country Differences. As well as national differences, within larger 
nations such as the USA, there may also be significant regional differences. Goodman et 
al (2003) focuses on medium to large companies in Georgia, whereas Hyland and 
Marcellino (2002) study Long Island, the fourth most affluent region in the US where 
31% of individuals have a first degree (national average = 17%) and 56% of women age 
16 or over are in the workforce (national average = 48%). Helms et al (2008) monitor 
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Tennessee, with lower than national and international statistics on WOCBs and a 
suggestion that the American South is less accepting of gender diversity. 
Private versus Public Initiatives. In Australia, there is no formal requirement 
for private or listed companies to consider board diversity, in contrast to the government 
sector which has 30 years of public policies to ensure boards are diverse or reflect the 
broader community (Ross-Smith and Bridge, 2008). Similarly in New Zealand, a 
microcosm of Western business, with only 1600 companies with more than 100 
employees, women hold just 7% of board directorships, and 63 of the top 100 
companies have no WOCBs (MacGregor and Fontaine, 2006). In contrast, women 
constitute over 35% of state sector board directorships (Hawarden and Stablein, 2009). 
These contrasting findings point to the danger of averaging national statistics, which 
would lead to misrepresentation. 
Cultural Attitudes, Infrastructure and Public Policy. Different countries’ 
socio-political beliefs and attitudes to women, work and families have a significant 
effect on both the possibility of individual women’s career progression and the 
country’s macro-economic environment. Within Europe contrasting attitudes, and 
therefore policies, led to some of the highest and lowest rates of WOCBs globally (see 
Figure 1.) 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
Some European countries have strong public policy initiatives. Traditionally 
considered a country with a strong macho culture, the Spanish government requires 
40% female representation on boards by 2015 (de Anca, 2008). Spain is following 
Norway’s example, where the government first encouraged and then mandated that all 
publicly listed companies have 40% female boards by January 2008 (Hoel, 2009). 
Sweden proposed quotas and fines but has not yet implemented legislation (Maitland, 
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2004). Changes in many European women’s working lives are predominantly driven by 
public policy, and it will be interesting to see if corporate initiatives will now take 
advantage of this talent pool. The USA model is in stark contrast to Europe as the 
impetus for demographic change comes almost entirely from private initiatives. Former 
Soviet Bloc countries are among the highest ranking for women in management (Wirth, 
2002) and on corporate boards (see Figure 1.) Under communism, women worked and 
had families. Highly subsidized childcare was the norm, and in an egalitarian social 
system, women gained relatively powerful social and economic positions. As 
Wittenburg-Cox and Maitland (2008: 206) share in their recent book, “it is no surprise 
that Germany’s first female Chancellor, Angela Merkel, is an East German. She was 
raised in a system that taught her to think she could lead.”  
Terjesen and Singh (2008)’s institutional perspective examines social, political 
and economic macro-environmental forces: presence of women in senior management, 
women’s historical role in government leadership and the gender pay gap. Based on a 
43 country dataset, they report that in countries where more women made it to the 
boardroom, there are also significantly more women in senior management and 
legislature positions, smaller gender pay gaps and, interestingly, a shorter period of 
women’s political representation. 
Economic Environment. Many of the studies incorporate data from the 
economic boom period of the 1990s, which Nelson and Levesque say should represent 
the best-case scenario for women. However, Arfken et al (2004) point to a peak of 
merger-and-acquisition activity in 2000, with many organizations merging their boards 
as well as their companies. This led to a reduction in the overall numbers of available 
positions, which limits the opportunity for board diversity.  
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IMPACT 
Individual 
Tokens and minority members. Women and others different to the dominant 
group are likely to face tokenism when they are the sole representative of their group 
characteristic (Kanter, 1977). The dominant group tends to see women first as female, 
embodying the sex role stereotype, and only later as individuals. This makes it difficult 
for women directors to be heard and importantly, listened to on an equal basis to other 
board members. Erkut, Kramer and Konrad (2009) find that such issues are reduced 
when there is more than one female director. They refer to a critical mass as when there 
were two or more women and found an impact on male colleagues, who were less likely 
to dismiss comments made by a woman, and an impact in the boardroom, where the 
culture was said to have been warmer and more open to wider discussions. The real 
change occur when there are three or more women on the board (Erkut et al, 2009) and 
women feel more comfortable, less constrained about what the men would think, and 
their interactions became more positive. Importantly, diversity becomes not a “woman’s 
issue” but group responsibility and the critical mass normalized women’s presence as 
leaders (Erkut et al, 2009). 
Role models. Women directors are role models who inspire others. Role 
modelling differs from mentoring where there is direct contact between partners, but 
many mentors are also be role models. Some women directors are careful about their 
role modelling behaviours so that they present an accomplished self (Singh, 2008). 
Executives below director level, especially women, watch and learn what to do and 
what not to do. Women directors are an important part of others’ work identity 
development (Sealy and Singh, 2006). Sealy (2008) explores whether role models are 
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important for senior women, and investigates how organizations select and profile top 
women, some of whom are FTSE 350 non-executive directors. 
 Diversity supporters. Whilst women at lower levels in firms may hope that 
female directors will advocate women’s issues, there is evidence that this may be a 
‘poisoned chalice’ that many senior women are reluctant to accept (Ashford, Rothbard, 
Piderit and Dutton, 1998). Perhaps WOCBs understand better the political arena and are 
more aware of the consequences if they were to fail. Bradshaw and Wicks (2000) find 
that Canadian WOCBs do not have a feminist change agenda, but see their role with the 
same priorities as those of male directors, protecting shareholder value. Bradshaw and 
Wicks (2000) express surprise at how few acts of resistance were reported by their 
female director interviewees. Women directors in engineering firms advise other 
women not to be crusaders, but rather engage leaders to take up the advocacy role 
(Singh, 2008), and to follow the “tempered radical” (Meyerson and Fletcher, 2000) 
small wins approach in their own divisions.  
 
Board 
Governance performance. A Canadian study of private sector, public sector 
and not-for-profit boards (Brown, Brown and Anastasopoulos, 2002) reveals that boards 
with three or more women are significantly different from all male boards. Three-
quarters of boards with women explicitly identify criteria for measuring strategy, 
compared to less than half of all-male boards, and 94% of boards with three or more 
women explicitly monitor the implementation of corporate strategy, compared to only 
two-thirds of all-male boards (Brown et al, 2002). There are similar statistics regarding 
conflict of interest guidelines, and ensuring a code of conduct for the organization. 
Furthermore, boards with two or more female directors place more importance on the 
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use of search consultants than other boards, which is likely to reduce the influence of 
the old boys’ network and increase transparency of selection. Boards with women 
directors are also more likely to have higher levels of board accountability, with formal 
limits to authority and formal director orientation programmes. Boards with three or 
more females are likely to ensure more effective communication among the board and 
its stakeholders. In addition, such boards are significantly more active in promoting 
non-financial performance measures such as customer satisfaction, employee 
satisfaction and gender representation, as well as considering measures of innovation 
and corporate social responsibility.  
In the UK, FTSE 100 firms with women directors adopted and reported the new 
governance practices recommended by the Higgs Review earlier than firms with all 
male boards. The significant differences in 2004 include having director induction and 
training, a regular review of board performance and the balance of board skills, 
knowledge and experience, and director succession planning structures, including 
approval for the use of external search consultants (Singh and Vinnicombe, 2004).  
Decision Making. Better corporate governance is achievable through sharing a 
broader and different range of experiences and opinions (Fondas and Sassalos, 2000). 
Homogenous boards tend not to recognise how similarly members think because these 
values are the norm for them (Maznevski, 1994). Women have different experiences of 
the workplace, marketplace, public services and community, and therefore women 
directors bring a different voice to debates and decision-making (Zelechowski and 
Bilimoria, 2004)  
On board behaviours and boardroom culture. Women’s boardroom presence 
leads to more civilized behaviour and sensitivity to other perspectives (Fondas and 
Sassalos, 2000; Bilimoria, 2000). Huse and Solberg (2006) report that women lighten 
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up the boardroom atmosphere. However Huse (2009) finds no relationship between the 
proportion of women directors and the openness of the board culture in Norwegian 
firms, but when women’s backgrounds differ from those of men, their contributions to 
the board working style are recognized. Huse warns that teasing out how women 
actually contribute is complex, because women contribute in different ways to the 
variety of governance tasks that the board is entrusted with. Women directors feel that 
their presence makes the board more sensitive to women’s issues (Burke, 1997). 
Singh (2008a) examines gendered boardroom cultures in engineering, high 
technology and scientific organizations. Directors with experience of working with 
women directors say that men are inclined to very political behaviour that is tempered 
when women are present, partly because women want to get on with the task in hand 
rather than “play games.” Other comments are that a male-only group can get carried 
away with the big agenda and miss a lot of the detail that women would pick up on. 
Male directors say that in the presence of women directors, men change their language, 
become more civilized, and moderate their masculinity. In their view, this led to more 
effective performance and better governance. 
On board independence. Women directors can enhance the independence of 
the board (Fondas and Sassalos, 2000). Izraeli (2000) comments that women are likely 
to take the role seriously, preparing conscientiously for meetings, a finding echoed by 
Huse and Solberg (2006). Women directors also frequently ask questions, meaning that 
decisions are less likely to be nodded through. CEOs report that women become more 
vocal and active as directors when there are three or more females (Konrad et al, 2008). 
On board skills, knowledge and experience. Women directors contribute 
unique skills, knowledge and experience to their boards, but their feminine attributes 
may be masked in boardroom cultures that do not allow expressive behaviours. This can 
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lead to the board having female representation but only masculine behaviours, losing 
the benefits of diversity (Sheridan and Milgate, 2005). Some CEOs have to persuade 
female and male directors that it is okay to express intuition and emotion, and that 
“feminine intuition” about some proposed strategy might well be just what the board 
needed to hear (Singh, 2008). Whilst this is an essentialist view of female talents, 
emotional intelligence of both women and men is increasingly valued at the very top. 
 
Firm 
Corporate financial performance. Many researchers explore the impact of 
women directors on firm level financial performance, reporting mixed results, although 
more positive relationships are found in recent studies. There is certainly a relationship 
between the presence of women directors and higher market capitalization in Fortune 
500 (Catalyst, 2004) and FTSE 100 firms (Singh and Vinnicombe, 2001, 2003). In the 
FTSE 100 study, the larger the firm’s market capitalization, the greater the likelihood is 
for multiple women directors, however market capitalization can be seen as a proxy for 
size. Firms with women directors are more likely to have larger workforces as well as 
larger boards (Burke, 2000; Singh and Vinnicombe, 2001). The internal talent pool is 
larger, arguably providing more opportunities for challenge and growth, and more 
routes to the top for women than in smaller firms. 
Research studies use a variety of performance measures to examine the link with 
board diversity, but results are mixed. A study of 200 Fortune 500 firms by Shrader, 
Blackburn and Iles (1997) finds that the percentage of women on the board (averaging 
8% in these firms in 1992) is negatively related to firm financial performance (ROE, 
ROA, ROI and ROS) measured in 1993 but positively related to the proportion of 
women in management.  
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Drawing on 1993 and 1998 data for 112 Fortune-listed firms, Erhardt, Werbel 
and Shrader (2003) examine the link between executive board diversity (25%; measured 
as the percentage of nonwhites and females on the board in 1997 and 1998) and ROA 
and ROI, using a five year interval to control for market fluctuation. They report a 
positive association with both financial indicators, suggesting that board diversity 
impacts overall firm performance, but not gender diversity.  
Another study of 797 Fortune 1000 firms’ board diversity finds that compared to 
firms with all-male boards, firms with at least two women on the board performed better 
on Tobin’s Q and ROA (Carter, Simkins and Simpson, 2003). However, Rose (2007) 
reports no relationship between Tobin’s Q and gender diversity on Danish boards, and 
speculates that women directors are so few and the culture so closed at the top (only 4% 
of supervisory directorships held by women) that assimilation of the attitudes and 
behaviours of existing male directors becomes inevitable for WOCBs, leading to 
negation of women’s diversity advantages. 
The presence of multiple female directors is associated with higher revenues, 
according to a study by Catalyst (1997) of the Fortune 500 firms, where the top 100 
companies by revenue are twice as likely to have multiple women on board compared to 
the bottom 100 companies. Burke (2000) also finds a similar correlation in top 
Canadian companies. Catalyst (2004) reports a positive link between gender diversity 
on boards and the bottom line as measured by return on investment and total return to 
shareholders in a sample of 353 Fortune 500 companies, with ROI being 35% and TRS 
being 34% higher in the group of firms with higher female representation in the top 
management team. 
Female Director Appointment Announcements. The immediate impact when 
a female director is appointed is another area of research interest. A study of Singapore 
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firms finds a positive 2.3% increase in share value over the two days following 
appointments of 34 female directors in 30 firms between 1988 and 2001, and this is 
enhanced when the new appointment is a female CEO. However there is no relationship 
between the proportion of women on the board and shareholder value (Ding and 
Charoenwong, 2004). Hence women directors are welcomed by Singaporean investors 
at the time of their appointment. Lee and James (2007) investigate the impact of 
appointment of female CEOs in the US on shareholder value, finding a more negative 
reaction to a female CEO compared to a male CEO and to female top team 
appointments, but less negative to a female CEO appointed from within the firm, 
compared to an outside hire. 
‘Glass Cliff’ Effect. The ‘glass cliff’ phenomenon describes how women are 
more likely than male directors to be placed in precarious situations (i.e. onto boards of 
poorly performing companies in periods of decline) (Ryan and Haslam, 2005). Poor 
performance is not associated with a recent appointment of a female director, and during 
a general economic downturn, companies that appointed a woman enjoy share price 
increases, though still suffer poor performance. When in executive positions, new 
women directors are highly visible and in danger of being criticized for their leadership 
style and individual abilities, which could result in a tarnished reputation if the 
downturn continued, whilst the context of their appointment at an unpropitious time was 
overlooked (Ryan and Haslam, 2005). Adams, Gupta and Leeth (2008) investigate 
female leadership appointments in US firms (1992-2004), finding that women tend to be 
appointed to CEO positions when firm performance is relatively good. Stock price 
performance preceding CEO appointments either favours females or there is no gender 
difference.  
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Ryan and Haslam (2008) further investigate WOCB appointments on both 
accountancy-based and stock-based measures, finding no relationship between women’s 
presence on boards and ‘objective’ accountancy-based measures of performance (ROA, 
ROE), thereby supporting the recent Adams et al. (2008) study. However, there is a 
significantly negative relationship with Tobin’s Q (Ryan and Haslam, 2008).  
Although these studies indicate mixed results regarding the relationship between 
WOCBs and various measures of financial performance, this should not diminish the 
validity of the view that gender diversity in the boardroom is beneficial to shareholder 
value. After a new male director is appointed, if there is a change in shareholder value 
either in the immediate or longer term, this would be unlikely to be attributed to his 
male gender – so why should we expect a female appointee to add directly to the 
corporate bottom line? We expect female directors to add value in many qualitative 
ways as indicated in this paper, which would not be discernable directly in the balance 
sheet in the short term. Diversity is part of exemplary corporate governance that 
enhances long-term shareholder value (Robinson and Dechant, 1997; Brown, Brown 
and Anastasapoulos, 2002).  
Shareholders and ethical investors. Bilimoria (2000) draws attention to the 
fact that powerful investors, such as union pension funds with many female members, 
are voicing concerns about the lack of gender diversity on US corporate boards, and that 
this would increase pressure on Chairs and CEOs to encourage female director 
appointments. Echoing this, Brown, Brown and Anastasopoulos (2002) comment that 
Canadian institutional shareholders are interested in board diversity, as they seek to 
invest in firms with good governance. Investors may see outcomes of good diversity 
management (such as women on the board) as an indicator of forward planning and 
future value in a globalising world where sensitivity to different cultures and diversity is 
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essential for long term survival. Companies with all male boards or those that have a 
large female workforce, or sell products targeted at women are particularly likely to be 
challenged by stakeholders. Women are increasingly the decision makers when it comes 
to major purchases such as houses, cars and holidays. Women directors may suggest 
new ways of bringing products to market, based on their personal experience as female 
customers. Where companies use market segmentation approaches, women’s 
involvement in strategic decision-making is essential in developing the firm’s capability 
to identify and tailor products to women (Daily et al, 1999).  
Corporate responsibility and philanthropy. WOCBs may impact corporate 
responsibility, as a study of corporate social responsiveness orientation in S&P firms 
indicates that women directors are more oriented towards discretionary elements of 
corporate responsibility than men (who are more concerned about economic 
performance). However, there are no significant gender differences with regard to the 
legal and ethical dimensions of corporate responsibility (Ibrahim and Angelidis, 1994). 
Favoured explanations are that women are more likely to be outside directors, and 
boards with more outsiders tend to be more philanthropic, or that women directors are 
younger and hence represent a generation gap. Williams’ (2003) study of Fortune 500 
firms from 1991-94 finds a link between WOCBs and the firm’s charitable support of 
community and cultural activities, but not for education. Williams (2003) suggests that 
women directors may find the influence on giving as a source of power, and speculates 
that as women take up more powerful committee roles, they may be less attracted to 
these aspects of corporate responsibility. Organizations with more equal representation 
of female and male board members are more able to fulfil social agency missions 
(Siciliano, 1996). 
 34 
Organizational legitimacy and corporate reputation. WOCBs have symbolic 
value both internally and externally. Where women hold executive directorships, firms 
are likely to gain legitimacy from female employees and from potential recruits as 
‘female-friendly employers’ with career tracks that advance women as well as men. 
Having women on the board, particularly in executive positions, makes it more difficult 
to claim that there is significant sex discrimination in the firm. CEOs surveyed as early 
as 1995 (Catalyst, 1995) comment that there is external political pressure and the 
feeling that it was the right thing to do. Interestingly, one CEO reports pressure from his 
wife, daughters and granddaughters who were scrutinising his performance on 
recruiting women to top positions! 
 Other women, in networks, as mentors, as inspirational role models. The 
number of women corporate directors on Fortune 500 boards is positively related to the 
number of women officers, number of women holding line management jobs, number 
of women holding high-ranking titles, number of women in the top earners of the 
company and a critical mass of women officers, the (Bilimoria, 2006). Senior women 
felt inspired when the first female director is appointed to an engineering board, seeing 
the appointment as a “huge milestone”. However the absence of women at board level 
leads to mixed results, with some women determined to be the first female director, and 
others feeling that their gender is an inevitable barrier to the top (Singh, 2008). In a 
survey of 219 senior women, 66% feel very optimistic about their careers if there are 
women directors on their board, rising to 69% when there are female executive directors 
(Singh, 2008). Seventy percent of the women strongly agree that when there are no 
women at the top who have children, this is an indicator that it is difficult to combine 
career and family in that organization. 
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Women directors provide mentoring and networking opportunities for more 
junior women to develop their careers (Bilimoria, 2000). Women directors are good at 
networking with other women (Catalyst, 1995) and often act as speakers at networking 
events, which women find very inspiring, and an opportunity to ask how the director 
had overcome the career and work/family challenges that attendees are experiencing 
(Singh, Vinnicombe and Kumra, 2004). These interactions increase the potential for 
women to find a wider variety of female role models, enabling them to emulate 
behaviours from a number of women as well as men, which Ibarra (1999) suggests is 
more beneficial than drawing on a single role model.   
Recruitment and retention. The presence of female directors symbolises career 
possibilities to prospective recruits, and also contributes to increased retention of 
women (Bilimoria, 2000). This is important when the economic cost of losing a well-
qualified woman is estimated as at least one and a half times her salary (ABA, 2000). 
 
Industry and Environment 
We did not find any example of the impact of women directors at the industry 
level. However, we did find examples at the environmental level. 
Citizens. Women’s presence as directors signifies that women play a full part as 
citizens of organizations and society. However, for them to have voice as citizens, the 
environment needs to be open to their influence, and in the past, the women who 
succeeded were pioneers or “travellers in a male world” (Marshall, 1984). More 
recently the trend is for “superwomen”: highly paid, working all hours, and flying 
around the globe. But for many, that comes at a personal cost, either not having children 
or outsourcing childcare.  
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Talent. Women directors are part of the talent pool for other directorships. 
Executive directors may seek their first non-executive post, or plan to move into a 
portfolio career with several NED positions. As part of the talent pool, women influence 
perceptions held by search consultants about the appropriateness of women for board 
appointments. They also influence and normalise the attitudes of Chairs and CEOs that 
women should be part of the talent pool at all levels. 
Symbols in media. When women are appointed to corporate boards, there is 
often a press fanfare that the glass ceiling has at last been broken, which Catalyst and 
Female FTSE indices clearly disprove with the almost imperceptible change in the 
proportion of women executive directors in both the US and UK over the last ten years. 
Female directors’ photographs are frequently displayed in the press, often alongside 
comments on their clothes, hairstyles and family status, using space that could be better 
allocated to their achievements and actions (Krefting, 2002). Unfortunately this practice 
shows no sign of diminishing. 
Figure 2 maps out the linkages described above across the four levels of 
analysis. With the key path shown in bold with larger arrows and indirect paths shown 
as dotted lines, Figure 2 shows that through human, social and cultural capital, board 
diversity is derived from individual director diversity (especially where there is a critical 
mass of women). Through board level processes such as quality of decision-making, 
board diversity influences governance outcomes, which in turn, impact firm level 
financial, social and reputational outcomes.  
Board processes are influenced by and influence individual directors. For 
example, minority directors often experience tokenism from other members both at an 
individual and group levels. Tokenism may hinder acceptance of women’s boardroom 
contributions, thereby negatively impacting performance, but this may be mitigated by 
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social ties to existing board members. Through advocacy of a woman director by a 
chairman, for example, individual women may achieve positive outcomes such as 
increased confidence and interlocking directorships. Such personal outcomes may 
influence the environment as chairmen and search consultants generally become less 
hostile to appointing diverse individuals. 
Firm characteristics such as larger size influence board characteristics, with a 
consistent correlation between market capitalization and the number of women 
directors. Firms with predominantly female consumers are facing increasing calls for 
women’s voices to be heard in the boardroom. Firm characteristics and processes such 
as succession planning schemes and mentoring programs influence retention, often 
assisted indirectly by female directors who symbolise the possibilities of progress for 
women. Firm and environment level characteristics combine to influence selection of 
women CEOs, as in the ‘glass cliff’ effect. Social, political and economic environmental 
characteristics such as national or regional cultures and government mechanisms also 
influence board selection processes, e.g. through quotas as in Norway, enabling women 
to play full citizenship roles in society. More female directors means an increase in 
potential role models for younger women, that can change the environment and attitudes 
towards women on the board. More women gaining non-executive directorships means 
that search consultants have a larger and experienced talent pool which to make their 
recommendations.  
Insert Figure 2 about here 
It is clear from this review that women play an influential role on corporate 
boards, but there are still major barriers to their access to such elite positions. When 
boards do include women, then there is evidence that corporate governance improves. 
We conclude with a detailed outline of future research directions at the four levels. 
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FUTURE RESEARCH 
Individual 
As extant literature is predominantly based on publically available information, 
truly innovative research would tap into the female directors’ experiences. Several 
directions are promising. First, as both Sheridan and Milgate (2005) and Huse and 
Solberg (2006) report that women directors partly attribute their selection to high 
visibility, an impression management lens could help answer questions such as: How do 
WOCBs manage their career stages? What strategies are applied in the public domain 
versus in the boardroom? 
A second promising area, also outlined by Ross-Smith and Bridge (2008) and 
Zelechowski and Bilimoria (2004), is the elaboration of director profiles including 
career paths and networks. Such in depth investigations, traditionally facilitated by 
archive data, could benefit from interviews and the utilization of life history calendars 
which take into account portfolio career perspectives (See Freedman et al, 1988 for an 
overview of methodology.) Research could explore the dynamics of the appointment 
process, considering a 360-degree perspective to capture the reasons for successful and 
unsuccessful applications. Furthermore, WOCBs’ post-board careers warrant further 
study. What linkages might former directors make between their old boards and their 
new positions? For example, until 2006, Lehman Brothers’ board included Dina Merrill 
(a former actress who appeared in Caddyshack II), and who is now a trustee to several 
community organizations (Berman, 2008; Wikipedia, 2008). Might other former 
directors join universities as executives-in-residence? Furthering career perspectives, we 
concur with Nelson and Levesque (2007) that much could be learned from women who 
exited. Key questions from a career perspective include: When and why do potential or 
 39 
actual women directors ‘opt out’ (Mainiero and Sullivan, 2007)? In terms of human and 
social capital theories, extant research has examined ‘what it takes’ to be named to 
boards - might there be potential sets which are unattractive in the selection process, for 
example an association with a company which has bankrupted? Research could explore 
gender differences.  
Third, if some women have many board appointments available to them (Farrell 
and Hersch, 2005) and given the increased responsibility of being on a board and the 
pressure for limited directorships, what are women’s selection criteria for serving on 
boards? Many of the above research questions, as well as below directions for board and 
firm research, could be explored using narratives from published autobiographies, such 
as Carly Fiorina’s (2007) memoir, Tough Choices. 
 
Board 
The “black box of the boardroom” has eluded most researchers - with Huse’s 
(2008) board observations an exception. Researchers could help answer the tough 
questions, especially in the wake of recent corporate governance failures: What role 
have WOCBs played in the pre-crisis decisions and post-crisis leadership of such 
corporations? Are WOCBs likely to be members or chairs of the increasingly common 
board ethics committees and governance committees? 
It would be interesting to obtain the views of Chairs and other board members 
about the relative usefulness of diverse human capital and social capital resources of 
incoming directors once they have been fully integrated into the board and its key 
committees. Might there be ambiguous resources that never come to fruition? How does 
the Chair’s view compare with that of the other directors? 
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Another stream could explore the board’s link to other firms, such as executive 
search consulting firms. How do these firms participate in board recruitment and skills 
assessment? Does gender diversity play a role?   
Links should be developed with other disciplines, such as corporate 
environmental studies, to identify how boards with women directors actually deal with 
increasingly important environmental issues. Do WOCBs take a different perspective in 
boardroom debates on corporate social responsibility, green environmental issues, or 
policies that influence the environment for employees on issues such as work/life 
balance? 
 
Firm 
There are suggestions that some firms address the visible lack of diversity by 
appointing a single non-executive/outside director, rather than addressing the longer-
term issue of an underdeveloped talent pool of senior women. Therefore, more research 
into executive team demography would bring this issue to light, addressing the issue of 
the pipeline. Key questions include: Are women executives mobile across companies, 
e.g. to be part of the talent pool in Firm A, but selected to serve on the board of Firm B? 
Websites such as theyrule.com facilitate the collection of networking data. 
There is a continual call for research which “proves” the added value of women 
on corporate boards to the bottom line. However, we caution that it is unreasonable to 
expect one female director to bring about a financial contribution soon after 
appointment. Researchers could concentrate on the direct outcomes of having more 
WOCBs, and look at when and how women contribute most effectively in their role as 
corporate board directors. Other key questions include: How do WOCBs impact 
relationships with key stakeholders such as fund managers or individual potential 
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employees? What role do women directors play in various corporate social 
responsibility initiatives as well as sustainability as a facet of corporate cultural and life 
cycle planning. 
 
Industry and Environment 
As explained earlier, industry research is uncommon. Thomas’ (2001) 
longitudinal study of female directors in top British retailing firms (1956-1997) 
introduces a standard for research in other sectors. Why are WOCBs found in certain 
industries? Do women directors move across industries? Are women entering the 
workforce aware of role models in certain industries, and does this affect their 
occupational and organizational choices? 
Initial investigations into the effects of regulations such as Sarbanes-Oxley 
(2002) and recommendations in the Higgs Review (2003), which do not explicitly detail 
guidelines on diversity by sex, suggest these have nevertheless impacted the 
accessibility of board positions to women (Sealy et al, 2007). Further questions here 
include: What impact do non-sex diversity initiatives have on WOCBs?  
As globalization brings new arenas such as China, India, Brazil and Russia 
under the spotlight, it would be useful to understand how the globalising environment 
influences women getting to the board. Another area of interest is the fast-modernising 
Middle East, where corporate governance and stock markets are not yet mature, but 
increasing access to education for women and changing career and family patterns are 
influencing the access and participation of women at decision-making levels in the 
business world.   
Most firms are required to report their corporate board demographics in proxy 
statements and annual reports, but in most countries it is not mandatory to report this 
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information on the entire executive team. We know little about the impact on industry, 
and how women’s wider range of experiences in private and public sectors influence the 
community, for example as school governors and mentors to teenage girls.  
As the lack of female access to corporate boardrooms is an international 
phenomenon, the field would benefit from further international studies. More countries 
(led by Catalyst in US and Canada) now conduct a census of WOCB. The European 
Commission regularly updates WOCB statistics on the top 50 companies in all EU 
countries But deeper investigation is needed beyond the statistics, and more 
collaboration is needed amongst the researchers so that there is transparency about 
board structures and governance systems, methodologies and sampling decisions. Taken 
together, future research should consider multiple levels of analysis- the individual, 
board, firm and industry/environment. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The aim of this paper was to review the most up-to-date and significant studies 
of women on corporate boards. We have identified what is known about how WOCB 
influences corporate governance and firm performance. We argue that this occurs 
through multi-level processes, as shown in Figure 2. The evidence shows that gender 
diversity on corporate boards contributes to more effective corporate governance 
through a variety of board processes, some of which do not show up as a direct 
influence on the firm’s bottom line, as well as through individual interactions. As well 
as governance outcomes, women directors contribute to important firm level outcomes 
as they play direct roles as leaders, mentors and network members as well as indirect 
roles as symbols of opportunity for other women, and inspire them to achieve and stay 
with their firm. More recognition is needed for their valuable contribution to firm value. 
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But as the WOCB demographics indicate, as corporate citizens most women do not yet 
have an equitable share in the governance of the firms in which they enact their careers.  
Much research interest has focused where data are readily available (e.g. board 
and director demographics and firm level financial data), rather than accessing boards 
directly. The lack of theoretical development in the overwhelming majority of the 180 
documents reviewed indicates an urgent need for more scholarship in this field.  
As Bilimoria (2000) comments, more efforts need to be made to disseminate 
research findings so that a stronger business case can be established. There has been 
considerable progress in terms of benchmarking across an increasing number of 
countries. Policies vary from overt intervention such as the quotas in Norway, to a 
conscious non-intervention approach, such as the US. Governments monitor the 
implementation and effectiveness of diversity policies and practices, using robust 
research results to design interventions. Research into women on corporate boards is an 
important tool, not only for making an academic contribution, but to provide the basis 
for change, not just for a more equitable but also for a more effective gender 
representation at the decision-making levels of the corporate world.
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Table 1: Women on Corporate Boards of Directors: Review structure 
 
 
Theory (representative citation) Characteristics Impact 
Individual Human Capital 
Status Characteristics 
Gender Self-Schema 
Demographics 
Social Capital 
Human Capital 
Tokens and minority members 
Role models 
Diversity supporters 
Board Social Identity 
Social Network and Social Cohesion 
Gendered Trust 
Ingratiation 
Leadership 
Structure and Size 
Roles 
Composition 
Governance performance 
Decision-making 
Behaviors and culture 
Independence  
Skills, knowledge and experience 
Firm Resource Dependency 
Institutional 
Agency 
 
Size 
Stakeholder distribution 
Performance 
Financial performance 
(announcements, ‘glass cliff’ effect) 
Shareholders and ethical investors 
Corporate responsibility and 
philanthropy 
Organizational legitimacy and 
corporate reputation 
Other women (networks, mentors, 
inspirational role models) 
Recruitment and retention 
Industry and 
Environment 
Institutional 
Critical Management 
International differences 
Within-country differences 
Private vs Public initiatives 
Cultural attitudes, infrastructure & 
public policy 
Economic environment 
Citizens 
Talent 
Symbols in media 
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Figure 1: Percentage of Women on Corporate Boards 
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Figure 2: Characteristics and Outcomes of Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards 
 
Individual
Director
Diversity
Characteristics
Board 
Characteristics
Human, Social & 
Cultural Capital
Firm
Characteristics
Environment
Characteristics
Individual 
level Processes
(eg tokenism,
advocacy)
Board Processes
Board Behaviors
Board Selection
Board Culture
Outcomes for
Individuals
(eg board
interlocks)
Board &
Governance
Outcomes
(eg wise 
decisions)
Firm Outcomes
(eg financial,
reputational
& social 
performance)
Environment 
Outcomes
(eg views 
of search
consultants)
Firm
Processes
(eg mentoring
retention)
Environmental
Processes
(eg more women
role modelling)
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i
 We also do not consider other types of board diversity such as race, ethnicity and nationality. 
ii
 When applicable, these studies are cited in subsequent sections on characteristics and impact. 
iii
 FTSE 100 stands for Financial Times Stock Exchange’s top 100 companies by market capitalization. 
iv
 Linkages to board and firm needs are articulated in the resource dependency section below. 
v
 Having obtained specific knowledge in functional areas in the firm, inside directors offer expertise in 
corporate strategy. Second, business expert directors have career experience as directors in other large 
firms, in similar markets, and offer diverse opinions and network ties. The third category, support 
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specialists, offer expertise in particular areas such as financial or legal realms. Community influentials 
often come from politics, clergy or academia and offer an understanding and linkage to this community. 
vi
 The terms “Non-Executive Director” and “Outside Director” refer to individuals on the board who do 
not have executive roles in the firm. The terms “Executive Director” and “Inside Director” describe firm 
employees who have roles on the board. 
